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Abstract
The Less is More hypothesis suggests that one reason adults and children differ
in their ability to learn language is that they also differ in other cognitive ca-
pacities. According to one version of this hypothesis, children’s relatively poor
memory may make them more likely to regularize inconsistent input (Hudson
Kam and Newport, 2005, 2009). This paper reports the result of an experimental
and computational investigation of one aspect of this version of the hypothesis.
A series of seven experiments in which adults were placed under a high cognitive
load during a language-learning task reveal that in adults, increased load during
learning (as opposed to retrieval) does not result in increased regularization. A
computational model offers a possible explanation for these results. It demon-
strates that, unless memory limitations distort the data in a particular way,
regularization should occur only in the presence of both memory limitations
and a prior bias for regularization. Taken together, these findings suggest that
the difference in regularization between adults and children may not be solely
attributable to differences in memory limitations during learning.
Keywords: regularization, less is more, computational modelling, language
acquisition
1. Introduction
In many ways, ranging from phonetic perception to aspects of syntax, chil-
dren are superior language learners than adults. Adults have difficulty with
many aspects of language acquisition, from phonetic perception (Werker and
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Tees, 1984; Werker and Lalonde, 1988; Kuhl, 2004), to language processing
(Clahsen and Felser, 2006), to certain aspects of syntax (e.g., Johnson and
Newport, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Birdsong, 2006). Scientists have proposed
many theories to account for the difference between children and adults; these
theories differ in both the degree and type of contribution made by pre-existing
language-specific biases.
Some argue that language acquisition in children is guided by language-
specific acquisition procedures, whereas adult acquisition is directed by more
domain-general learning mechanisms (e.g., Bley-Vroman, 1990). However, there
are many other possibilities, since children and adults also differ profoundly
in their cognitive capabilities, knowledge, assumptions, and typical linguistic
input. Learning a second language is made more difficult by interference from
the first language (e.g., Mayberry, 1993; Iverson et al., 2003; Tan, 2003; Weber
and Cutler, 2003; Hernandez et al., 2005). Adults and children also differ in the
plasticity of their brains (Elman et al., 1996; MacWhinney, 2005), their style of
learning (Ullman, 2004), and the nature of the social support (Snow, 1999) and
linguistic input (Fernald and Simon, 1984) they receive.
One hypothesis, often called Less is More, suggests that the relative cogni-
tive deficits in children may actually help with language acquisition. There are
several versions of the Less is More hypothesis. The most general suggests that
“starting small” – whether via restricted input, or as a byproduct of limited
cognitive capacity – can help a learner to isolate and analyze the separate com-
ponents of a linguistic stimulus (Newport, 1988, 1990). There is considerable
support for this version of the hypothesis. Cochran et al. (1999) taught adults a
novel sign language normally as well as under conditions of memory load. They
found that adults who were not under memory load learned faster but made
more errors caused by producing signs holistically, rather than analyzing the
individual components. In a similar study, Kersten and Earles (2001) found
that adults taught a miniature artificial language learned better if they were
first presented with individual words and only later presented with complex
sentences. Starting small has also been found to help adults learning recursion
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in artificial grammars (Lai and Poletiek, 2010) and foreign natural languages
(Chin and Kersten, 2010). In addition, Elman (1993) discovered that neural
networks could be trained to process complex sentences, but only if, during the
initial stages of training, the network had limited memory and was given limited
input (though other modelers have found different results; see, e.g., Rohde and
Plaut, 1999).
Another version of Less is More suggests that limited capacity may lead
children to regularize inconsistent input (Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005, 2009;
Hudson Kam and Chang, 2009). Regularization may be a beneficial strategy
when the variability in the observed forms is not conditioned on a previous
linguistic context. Unpredictable variation of this sort is not commonly found
in most languages, at least in the speech of native speakers (e.g., Chambers
et al., 2003); however, it is much more common when learning from non-native
speakers (Wolfram, 1985; Johnson et al., 1996). In such circumstances, when
the input is truly inconsistent, regularization can be beneficial.
It is precisely in those circumstances that regularization is often observed.
Deaf children produce regular grammatical forms despite being exposed to the
inconsistent sign language of their hearing parents (Singleton and Newport,
2004), as will children exposed to inconsistent input in an artificial language
(Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005, 2009). Childrens’ tendency to regularize
may even lead to the creolization of initially inconsistent languages (Senghas
and Coppola, 2001). By contrast, adult language learners are known to produce
highly variable, inconsistent utterances, even after years of experience with the
language and after their grammars have stabilized (Johnson et al., 1996).
This difference between children and adults has also been found in non-
linguistic domains. If adults must predict some phenomenon, like a light flashing
or a certain card being drawn from a deck, in most circumstances they will tend
to probability match: if the phenomenon occurs 70% of the time, they will
predict it 70% of the time, even though predicting it 100% of the time would
result in more correct predictions (see Myers, 1976, for an overview). Children
are more likely to predict that the phenomenon will occur closer to 100% of
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the time (e.g., Weir, 1964; Derks and Paclisanu, 1967), although many still do
not. A similar pattern has been found in causal reasoning: children regularize
by assuming that causes are deterministic, while adults do not (Schulz and
Sommerville, 2006).
Although children’s tendency toward regularization is fairly well-established,
the reason for the difference between adults and children is less clear. The Less is
More hypothesis suggests that regularization may be due to some limitations on
children’s cognitive capacity, but exactly how and why such limitations should
lead to regularization is somewhat underspecified. Memory is often identified
as a possible culprit. For instance, in one of the clearest statements of how
Less is More relates to regularization, Hudson Kam and Newport (2009, page
61) suggest that “one possibility is that children are worse at directed memory
search than adults. Another possibility is that children are less efficient at
laying down memory traces, with the consequence that they have more difficulty
retrieving specific forms (therefore especially those that are lower in frequency
or less broadly or consistently used).”
This clearly identifies memory as a potential issue, but the precise details are
still unclear: what predicts which forms should be hard to lay down or access,
and why? Is the issue with encoding, storage, retrieval, or all of the above?
Are the relevant limitations in working memory, short-term memory, long-term
memory, or an interaction between them? What specific model of memory is
being assumed, where does the limitation lie, and why would that limitation
result in regularization?
Hudson Kam and Chang (2009) are slightly more specific, suggesting that
memory limitations may interfere with accurate retrieval (although not ruling
out the possibility that differences during encoding might also have an effect).
Consistent with this, they found that adults who were given cues that made
retrieval easier ended up probability matching more precisely than adults who
were not given such cues. However, the details of how and why retrieval limita-
tions should lead to regularization are still somewhat underspecified. The most
precise explanation suggests that “when retrieval is difficult, the most easily
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accessible form is likely to be retrieved repeatedly, resulting in regularization.”
(page 816) However, why this is likely or what assumptions about memory
should lead to this are not made clear.
This relative lack of detail is natural given the newness of the Less is More
hypothesis as regards regularization. However, it does mean that many open
questions remain. If regularization is due to limitations on memory, under what
circumstances and for what assumptions about memory might we expect it to
occur? Should we expect it to be limited to retrieval, or might effects arising
during learning – while information is being processed, encoded, and stored –
matter as well? If so, why, and under what circumstances?
These questions lead to the two main goals of this paper. The first goal is
to empirically explore whether and to what extent memory limitations during
encoding might affect regularization. This has not been investigated before and
is an open question. To that end, the first section reports the result of seven ex-
periments in which adults were placed under memory load while simultaneously
learning a simple artificial “language” composed of nouns paired inconsistently
with determiners. This load, which occurred during the encoding phase of lan-
guage learning, did not increase regularization in any of the conditions.
The second goal of the paper is make precise – and then systematically inves-
tigate – a range of possibilities about how and why memory limitations during
learning could affect the generalizations (and hence the extent of regularization)
of the learner. This is accomplished with a computational model that examines
a variety of different theories about how memory limitations during learning
might affect the pattern of data available to the learner. The modeling also
explores how these memory limitations might interact with prior biases for or
against regularization. Results indicate that regularization only occurs when
both memory limitations and a prior bias for regularization are present; nei-
ther alone is sufficient. Regularization can only occur without a prior bias if
the memory process itself distorts the pattern of data available to the learner
in a particular way, which does not at present appear to correspond to any
well-established models of memory encoding.
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Taken together with the experimental findings, these results suggest that
adult-child differences in regularization probably do not emerge from differences
in memory limitations during encoding. I conclude the paper by discussing
other possibilities, among them that adults and children have different prior
biases about how to respond to inconsistent input; that regularization is caused
by limitations in other cognitive capacities; and that any effects due to memory
are more likely to occur during retrieval rather than encoding.
2. Experiments
2.1. Method
179 English-speaking adults were recruited from the University of Adelaide
and surrounding community. They were paid $10 or received course credit for
their participation; of these, four were excluded due to equipment failure (2) or
a refusal to say anything during the word-learning task (2). Thus there were
25 participants in each of the conditions. All conditions within the experiment
consisted of two parts, both presented on a computer in the Computational
Language and Cognition Lab at the University of Adelaide. The experiment was
programmed in matlab and auditory stimuli were presented over headphones.
In the first part of the experiment, individual differences in working memory
capacity were estimated using a standard complex span task (Conway et al.,
2007; Unsworth et al., 2009). In the second part of the experiment, subjects
completed a word-learning task modelled on the paradigm described by Hudson
Kam and Newport (2009) in which they were taught 10 two-word labels from
a new language. Interspersed with the word-learning task, participants in six
of the seven conditions completed an interference task designed to tax their
working memory; these conditions will be described in detail later. In a control
condition, the no load condition, participants performed the word-learning
task only.
2.1.1. Complex span task
Complex span tasks are widely used to measure the capacity of the working
memory system (Conway et al., 2005; Unsworth et al., 2009). In a complex
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span task, items to be remembered (e.g., random letters, digits, shapes, or spa-
tial locations) are interspersed with an unrelated cognitive activity (e.g., solving
equations, reading sentences, or evaluating the symmetry of patterns). After
several trials, participants are asked to recall the items to be remembered in
the correct serial order. This sort of task is differentiated from a simple span
task (e.g., Digit Span from the Wechsler scales), which only includes the mem-
orization component. It has been argued that complex span tasks provide a
measure of working memory, as opposed to span memory, because they entail
the requirement to process as well as to store information, although both types
of task provide measures of memory capacity and maintenance. Complex span
tasks have good internal consistency (Kane et al., 2004; Conway et al., 2007)
and test-retest reliability (Klein and Fiss, 1999). They have been shown to cor-
relate with cognitive processes that are believed to depend on working memory
(Conway et al., 2007; Unsworth and Engle, 2007), and are linked to disorders in-
cluding Alzheimer’s disease (Rosen et al., 2002) and schizophrenia (Stone et al.,
1998). They have also been widely used to explore age differences in working
memory capacity (Case et al., 1982; Salthouse and Babcock, 1991).
Two common span tasks incorporate demands on either operational span
(Turner and Engle, 1989) or on verbal span (Daneman and Carpenter, 1980).
In an operational span task, participants are presented with equations such as
4/2 + 2 = 3 and told to say, as quickly as possible, whether the equation is
correct. In a typical verbal span task, subjects are presented with an 11-15
word sentence and told to say, as quickly as possible, whether the sentence
makes sense. In order to enable comparison across participants, in the first
part of the experiment all participants were presented with an operational span
task regardless of condition. On each trial people first saw an equation and
were asked whether it was correct or not. After each response, a random letter
was shown. At the end of a set of n letters, participants were asked to repeat
the list of letters in order, given unlimited time to do so. To make sure that
they understood the task, they were first trained on two sets of two trials each.
The full task comprised two sets each of sizes ranging from an n of three to
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an n of seven, for a total of 50 trials. For each participant a working memory
capacity score was calculated, reflecting the number of correct letters recalled
in the correct position.
2.1.2. Word-learning task
After the complex span task, all participants took part in an artificial lan-
guage learning task modelled after a similar task described by Hudson Kam and
Newport (2009). Their language contained 51 words, including 36 nouns and
12 verbs, among other lexical items, taught over the course of eight separate
sessions extending for 9-12 days. Of critical interest in their study was the pro-
duction of the determiners, which were associated with nouns in an inconsistent
fashion: participants heard the main determiner only 60% of the time. In one
condition, they heard nothing the other 40% of the time; in other conditions,
they heard increasingly more noise determiners: for instance, two determiners
(each 20% of the time), and so forth up to 16 determiners (each 2.5% of the
time). Performance was measured in a sentence completion task in which par-
ticipants had to provide the noun and determiner associated with a scene after
being prompted with the beginning part of the sentence (the verb).
The present research sought to remove extraneous elements of the task so
as to focus only on the production of the inconsistent input. Participants were
therefore presented with a “language” of 10 items that for simplicity I will
call “nouns”, all two-syllable nonsense words1 mapped to images representing
common objects.2 Each noun was followed by a one-syllable consonant-vowel-
consonant (CVC) “determiner”: the main determiner occurred 60% of the time
with each noun, and each of the four noise determiners occurred 10% of the
time with each noun.3 The distribution of determiners across items thus pre-
cisely matched the global distribution of determiners, making the determiners
completely inconsistent. After seeing the image-label pairs, participants were
1Noun words used were: dragnip, raygler, churbit, tramdel, shelbin, pugbo, wolid, foutray,
nipag, and yeetom.
2Objects used were: babies, balls, beds, birds, books, cars, cats, cups, dogs, and shoes.
3The five determiners were: mot, ped, sib, kag, and zuf.
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asked to produce novel labels of their own; the key question was whether they
would regularize by producing a determiner (or no determiner) close to 100% of
the time, rather than the amount it occurred in the input. The specific details of
which word mapped to which meaning and which determiner was the main de-
terminer were randomized for each participant. Participants were not told there
were two “parts” (noun and determiner) to each label, and since the labels were
presented orally this was not made obvious through visual presentation.4
All labels were recorded by a female speaker on a Windows computer from
mono input using the software program Cubase. In order to ensure that the
speech was as natural as possible, each noun was recorded with each determiner,
rather than recording them individually and playing them one after another,
which would produce odd coarticulation effects. Each label was spoken clearly
and with normal intonation at the pace of standard adult-directed speech.
Over the course of the task, participants saw 200 trials of image-label pairs;
since there were 10 labels and 10 objects, participants saw each possible object-
label pair 20 times during the experiment. There were 10 different image tokens
for each object (e.g., ten different pictures of babies) and each image appeared
once in the first 100 trials and once in the second 100 trials. On each trial, an
image appeared on the computer screen and, at the same time, the person heard
a female voice provide the label: for instance, participants might see a picture
of a baby and hear the words churbit mog.
In the no load condition, participants went to the next trial by clicking
a Next button. In the load conditions, explained below, participants had to
perform additional tasks interspersed with the word learning. In all conditions,
learning was tested with 10 questions every 50 trials, for a total of 40 test
questions. At each test, the participant was presented with a novel image and
4It is not critical that these be called nouns and determiners, respectively; in fact, since the
determiners lack any semantics, it might be more appropriate to call them particles. However,
for clarity, I chose to follow the convention established by Hudson Kam and Newport (2009).
The critical point is that part of the label (the “noun”) maps consistently to the image, while
the other part (the “determiner”) doesn’t; we are interested in how participants respond to
this sort of inconsistent input.
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the six load conditions. Each box represents a different
screen seen by the participant. In all conditions, participants were presented with the word
learning trials. The load conditions differed according to the task required of the participant
either in between or concurrently with the word learning task.
asked to verbally produce the label for it, which the experimenter wrote down
as accurately as possible. No feedback was given, and the experimenter was
blind to the correct mapping of labels and objects for that participant.
2.1.3. Conditions
There were six different load conditions, described below and illustrated in
Figure 1. A wide range of conditions were investigated in order to thoroughly
explore the space of possible ways that memory could be tasked in a word-
learning experiment such as this. The goal was to be as certain as possible that
at least some of the load tasks substantially taxed working memory while still
allowing some learning.
In all conditions the adults were told that we were interested in how well
people could learn words when the task was difficult. Thus, while they were
learning the words, they would be asked to do something else (the details differed
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by condition as explained below). Participants were informed that they would
be tested on their understanding of the language by the experimenter every 50
trials. They were also told that would be expected to simultaneously do as well
on the load task as possible and would be given feedback throughout on their
performance on it. It was acknowledged that high performance in both tasks
might be difficult, but we were interested in how well they could achieve this.
The first two load conditions were modelled after the operational and verbal
span tests used to measure working memory. These conditions taxed load by
interspersing word-learning trials with items from these working memory tasks.
Verbal load. This task was modelled after the verbal span test of Daneman
and Carpenter (1980). After each image-label pair, participants were presented
with an 11-15 word sentence, told to read it aloud, and then asked to respond
as quickly as possible whether it was sensible or not. Half of the sentences were
sensible, and half were made non-sensible by replacing a content word with a
semantically inappropriate one. For example, a typical sentence is “Cats really
love to sit in the sun, since they are desert animals” while the corresponding non-
sensible sentence would replace animals with chimneys. No participant saw both
the sensible and non-sensible version of a sentence. Accuracy and elapsed time
was displayed in order to encourage peak performance.
Operational load. This condition was modelled after the operational span
test of Turner and Engle (1989). After each image-label pair, participants were
presented with an equation and told to respond as quickly as possible whether it
was correct or not. Half of the equations were correct, and half gave an answer
that was one digit away from correct. In order to encourage participants to
be as fast and correct as possible, a running total of their cumulative number
correct and elapsed time was displayed on the screen.
These two load conditions have the advantage that they are modelled after
tasks designed to load on working memory, but they have the disadvantage that
they are interspersed with the word learning task rather than concurrent with
it. It is therefore possible that they might not interfere enough with concurrent
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working memory to have an effect on the pattern of word learning. The next
two conditions address this possibility.
Low concurrent load. In this condition, each image was preceded by a
list of three letters to memorize, randomly selected from the following set of
letters: F, H, J, K, L, N, P, Q, R, S, T, and Y. No single list contained the same
letter twice. After viewing the list for 2.5 seconds, the image was displayed for
1.5 seconds while the label was heard. This was followed by a response phase
in which participants reported the last set of letters in order. At that point
memorization accuracy and the time taken to respond were displayed, in order
to encourage participants to continue responding quickly and accurately. When
the participant pressed Next the next set of letters to memorize appeared.
High concurrent load. This condition is identical to the low concurrent
load condition except that participants were presented with lists of six rather
than three letters. The list was visible for the same duration and subject to the
same constraints, and the procedure by which list and image-label presentation
were combined was also identical.
Although the two concurrent load conditions are specifically designed to tax
concurrent working memory, there is still one shortcoming: the word learning
task is linguistic, and this type of load may not provide the best conflict with
a language-based task. Therefore, two additional conditions were added that
were designed based on the literature investigating what kinds of tasks disrupt
linguistic processing.
Concurrent operational load. In a study investigating the extent of the
domain-specificity of the verbal working memory resources used during linguis-
tic processing, Fedorenko et al. (2007) discovered that linguistic processing is
disrupted by tasks that involve arithmetic integration. In their experiments,
participants read sentences of varying complexity while simultaneously solving
equations. Sentences were presented phrase by phrase, and each phrase was
paired with part of an equation; participants were expected to parse the sen-
12
tence while maintaining a running total for the equation. This task is quite
different from the word-learning task in this study, since the Fedorenko et al.
(2007) study was focused on information integration during the course of reading
a complex sentence. However, because it reported a load task that demonstra-
bly did disrupt some aspect of linguistic processing, I thought it valuable to
include a condition that mimicked that load task as closely as possible.
Thus, in the concurrent operational load condition, participants were
presented with an equation to solve at the same time as they were shown each
image-label pair. Each equation was similar to those in the complex span task,
and consisted of one term involving a simple multiplication followed by another
term involving addition or subtraction (e.g., 6/6+4 or 4/2-1). As in the complex
span task, equations were constrained so that all answers and terms were integers
between zero and ten, exclusive. As in previous conditions, the image was
visible for 1.5 seconds. Immediately following it, participants were asked for
the solution to the equation. As soon as they entered the solution, they were
presented with a new equation and image-label pair. Feedback about whether
they answered the previous equation correctly was displayed in the upper left
corner of the screen.
Concurrent verbal load. Work by Gordon et al. (2002) suggests that
interference with a linguistic task is higher when the interfering task consists of
similar items. These authors found that syntactic processing was disrupted when
participants had to parse sentences while simultaneously having to memorize
lists of words that were similar to the words in the sentences. To illustrate
this, consider a sentence like “It was Tony that Joey liked before the argument
began.” Participants performed more accurately on a comprehension test about
the sentence if they were asked to simultaneously remember a list of common
nouns (e.g., poet-cartoonist-voter) than if they were asked to simultaneously
remember a list of proper male names like those in the sentence (e.g., Joel-
Greg-Andy).
I mimicked this situation as closely as possible by requiring participants
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to memorize lists of four nonsense CVC words. These nonsense words had a
similar form as the determiners, and thus potentially provided a high amount
of interference. The set of possible nonsense words was: nid, zep, lum, dit,
vok, pob, faz, kiv, sug, bef, rin, and tal. No single list presented to participants
contained the same word twice. The Gordon et al. (2002) study used lists of
three words, but I decided to use lists of four because participants seemed to
be able to manage lists of six letters in the high concurrent load condition
and I wanted to make the task as difficult as possible; however, since nonsense
words are more difficult than letters, I thought six might be too much. As in
the high and low concurrent load conditions, participants viewed each list for
2.5 seconds and the image was displayed for 1.5 seconds. This was followed by a
response phase in which participants reported the last set of letters in order, and
memorization accuracy and elapsed time were displayed. When the participant
pressed Next the next set of words to memorize appeared.
2.2. Results
There are three natural questions one must answer in order to properly
understand this experiment. First, are the load tasks difficult enough? Second,
did participants in any of the load conditions regularize the determiners more?
Third, did individual differences in performance on the initial complex span
task predict performance on the word learning task? The answer to the first
question is an essential pre-requisite to interpreting the answers to the other
two because if the load tasks were not challenging enough, comparisons between
conditions are meaningless. The answers to the other two bear directly on the
questions motivating this work: does putting adults under cognitive load cause
them to make the same regularization errors that children do? Were adults with
poorer performance on the complex span task, who have lower working memory
capacity, more likely to make those errors? I address each of these questions in
turn.
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2.2.1. Were the load tasks difficult enough?
It is non-trivial to definitively determine whether the load tasks difficult
enough to significantly impair working memory capacity while still being easy
enough that something could be learned in the first place. What is “enough”?
Although this question is difficult to answer, we can at least evaluate converging
evidence from several different directions by investigating a variety of possible
indicators.
One possible indicator relates to accuracy learning the noun-image map-
pings. Each of the 10 images was randomly but consistently paired with one
of the 10 possible nouns, and the accuracy with which the participant learned
those mappings is an indication of how difficult they found the task. One would
expect that performance would be substantially worse in the load conditions if
the secondary task provided a sufficient challenge to the cognitive capacities of
our participants.
To explore this, each person’s answers were coded as correct if the noun
they produced was identical to or phonologically similar to the correct noun for
that image (e.g., wolin instead of wolid). Nouns were counted as “phonologically
similar” if they had at least one syllable in common with the correct noun, and
it was obvious which of the ten nouns was the intended target. For instance,
dragler would not be counted as correct if the correct noun was dragnip, be-
cause although there is considerable phonological overlap, there is an equivalent
amount of overlap with another possibility (raygler). However, dragzoo would
be counted as an instance of the word dragnip, because there are no words that
end in zoo. All nouns were coded by the author, but in order to ensure ac-
curacy and objectivity, reliability analysis was undertaken. A random subset
of approximately 10% of the participants (17 people, two to three from each
condition) were recoded by a second coder who was blind to the decisions made
by the first coder. The reliability between the two coders was high, reflected in
a Cronbach’s α of 0.9703 (N=680).
Figure 2 demonstrates that participants in all of the load conditions got fewer
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Figure 2: Performance by condition in the noun-learning task. Participants in the load con-
ditions learned significantly fewer nouns than in the no load condition, suggesting that the
load task provided sufficient cognitive challenge to impair performance.
nouns correct than in the no load condition. This suggests that the interference
tasks did indeed impose a significant strain on their cognitive resources. A
one-way ANOVA on nouns correct by condition was significant (F (6, 168) =
6.298, p < 0.0001). Planned comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni method to
adjust for multiple comparisons indicated that the mean nouns correct in the no
load condition was significantly different from all other conditions.5 In order
to establish that the load tasks were more difficult throughout word learning,
rather than just at the beginning, the same analysis was performed for the first
half (twenty) and last half (twenty) test trials, as well as for the last ten trials.
There was a significant effect of condition in all cases (first half: F (6, 168) =
6.554, p < 0.0001; last half: F (6, 168) = 5.134, p < 0.0001; final ten: F (6, 168) =
5concurrent verbal: p < 0.0001; concurrent operational: p < 0.0001; high con-
current: p = 0.0034; verbal: p = 0.0207; low concurrent: p = 0.0295; operational:
p = 0.0234.
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4.515, p = 0.0002). Planned comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni method
revealed that the no load condition was significantly different from all other
conditions in the first half of the trials, and from the concurrent verbal,
concurrent operational, and high concurrent conditions in the second
half and final ten trials.6
Another indication that participants were attending to the load task and
took it seriously is their performance on it. For three of the conditions, chance
performance on the load task was 50%: participants were asked questions with
two possible answers. One-sample t-tests reveal that in all of these condi-
tions, performance was significantly higher than chance (operational load:
M = 0.95, SD = 0.06, t = 36.33, df = 23, p < 0.0001; verbal load: M =
0.80, SD = 0.18, t = 8.42, df = 24, p < 0.0001; concurrent operational
load: M = 0.76, SD = 0.11, t = 11.63, df = 24, p < 0.0001).7 The other three
conditions required participants to memorize lists. Although it is difficult to
elucidate a standard that one would expect participants to attain in this task,
people in all conditions succeeded in memorizing many words. They memorized
an average of 3.36 letters per trial in the high concurrent load condition
(56% of the letters they were presented with), 2.54 letters per trial in the low
concurrent load condition (84% of the letters they were presented with),
and 1.78 words per trial in the concurrent verbal load condition (44% of
the words they were presented with).
To what extent is performance on the load task correlated with accuracy in
learning nouns? A negative correlation between performance on the load task
and accuracy might suggest that different participants adopted different strate-
gies during the experiment: perhaps some focused most of their effort on the
6First half: concurrent verbal: p < 0.0001; concurrent operational: p = 0.0002;
high concurrent: p = 0.0105; verbal: p = 0.0074; low concurrent: p = 0.0344; op-
erational: p = 0.0235. Second half: concurrent verbal: p < 0.0001; concurrent op-
erational: p = 0.0001; high concurrent: p = 0.0028. Final ten: concurrent verbal:
p < 0.0001; concurrent operational: p = 0.0008; high concurrent: p = 0.0023.
7Note that for one participant in the operational load condition, an equipment failure
meant that performance on the load items was not recorded; however, the rest of their data
was retained so they were included.
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load tasks and others focused theirs on the word learning task. However, the
correlation between performance on the load task and overall accuracy was posi-
tive, suggesting instead that the participants who learned more nouns performed
more highly on the interference task rather than less (r = 0.344, p < 0.0001).
This suggests that the participants were performing on the load task to the
limits of their abilities, and those participants with greater abilities were able
to perform better on both the load task and the word learning task.
2.2.2. Did adults regularize more when under cognitive load?
The central question motivating this research was whether adults placed
under cognitive load could be made to look more like children. To evaluate this,
following Hudson Kam and Newport (2009), I excluded all participants who did
not get at least 9 out of the final 20 nouns correct on the test trials.8 Then,
on every valid trial (i.e., every trial for which a correct noun was produced) I
defined a participants’ regularization index as the proportion of relevant trials
on which that person produced their most frequent determiner (including none
as one of the possible determiner types). The index is therefore higher for those
participants who regularize more.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition (F (6, 109) =
3.84, p = 0.002), but as Figure 3 demonstrates, the trend, if anything, was for
people in the load conditions to regularize less than in the no load condition.
Planned comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni adjustment method indicated
that the only condition that was significantly different than no load was con-
current verbal – and in that condition people regularized less (p = 0.002).
How much were these results driven by the exclusion of participants who
did not get 9 out of the final 20 nouns correct? To test this, I performed the
same ANOVA on regularization by condition, but included all participants. The
results were qualitatively identical.9 The same results were attained when reg-
8This resulted in 23 subjects in the no load condition, 19 in low concurrent load, 18
in operational load, 17 in verbal load, 15 in high concurrent load, 14 in concurrent
operational load, and 10 in concurrent verbal.
9There was once again a significant effect of condition (F (6, 165) = p = 0.002), with the
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Figure 3: Regularization by condition. The regularization index (plotted on the y axis) is the
proportion of trials on which each person produced their most frequent determiner. A higher
index therefore reveals more regularization. Participants in the load conditions were no more
likely to regularize than participants in the no load condition, and the trend was toward less
regularization in the load conditions.
ularization was evaluated on trials in which participants produced any response
at all, instead of just the trials where the noun was correct,10 on the second half
of test trials,11 and on the final ten test trials.12 There was no significant effect
of condition at all on the first half of the test trials (F (6, 108) = 1.07, p = 0.386).
In order to ensure that these results were not driven by some characteristic
of the regularization index, I also calculated percentage of time either the main
no load condition having the second-highest regularization index (although this time the
planned comparisons showed that no conditions were significantly different from no load).
10There was a significant effect of condition (F (6, 109) = 3.26, p = 0.006), and planned com-
parisons (Holm-Bonferroni) indicated that the only condition that was significantly different
than no load was concurrent verbal, in which people regularized less (p = 0.002).
11The effect of condition was significant (F (6, 109) = 3.34, p = 0.005) and planned com-
parisons (Holm-Bonferroni) indicated that the only condition that was significantly different
than no load was concurrent verbal, in which people regularized less (p = 0.002).
12The effect of condition was significant (F (6, 109) = 3.06, p = 0.008) and planned com-
parisons (Holm-Bonferroni) indicated that the only condition that was significantly different
than no load was concurrent verbal, in which people regularized less (p = 0.003).
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determiner, a noise determiner, or no determiner was produced. There were no
significant differences between conditions in terms of determiner production for
any of the three determiner types: that is, participants in the load conditions did
not produce any of the three determiners more often according to this measure
either.13 As before, there were no qualitative differences to this result when all
of the participants were included, when the trials in which participants produced
any response at all were evaluated, and when the analysis was restricted to the
first half, second half, or final ten test trials. In all cases, there was no significant
effect of condition on determiner production; as before, if anything the trend
was for there to be less regularization in the load conditions.
A final possibility is that, even if global regularization was not affected by
memory load, lexically-specific regularization might have been. This possibil-
ity is inspired by Hudson Kam and Newport (2009), Smith and Wonnacott
(2010), and Wonnacott (2011), which found that people may sometimes impose
regularization on a lexical level even if the global statistics remain unchanged.
That is, they might use some determiners consistently with some nouns, even
if overall the distribution of determiners matches the input data. Examining
lexically-specific regularization was not an original goal of this study, and it is
difficult to do with reliability since each noun occurred only four times over
the course of all of the test trials. With this caveat in mind, I nevertheless
followed Smith and Wonnacott (2010) and calculated the average conditional
entropy for each participant of their determiners given each noun; lower ab-
solute conditional entropy reflects more rgularization. A one-way ANOVA on
the average entropy across conditions revealed no significant effect of condi-
tion (F (6, 109) = 1.60, p = 0.154), suggesting that the load did not increase
regularization on the lexical level any more than it did on the global level.
These findings are suggestive, but because it is an analysis of mean perfor-
mances this outcome may be hiding individual regularization in different direc-
13Main: F (6, 109) = 1.99, p = 0.074; none: F (6, 109) = 1.48, p = 0.191; noise: F (6, 109) =




Figure 4: Individual consistency in determiner production by condition. For the most part, few
participants showed any consistency in their pattern of determiner usage, and those in the load
conditions did not tend to be more consistent. The top row shows results when performance
was coded as “consistent” if a response was the same for 90% of trials; the bottom shows
results for a threshold of 80%. (a) Results following the exclusion conditions of Hudson Kam
and Newport (2009), in which only participants who got at least 9 out of 20 nouns correct
were included, and only valid trials (in which the noun was correct) were examined. (b)
Results including all participants and all trials in which the participant offered any response.
(c) Results following the Hudson Kam and Newport (2009) exclusion conditions when the
consistency threshold is 80%. (d) Results without the exclusion conditions for a consistency
threshold of 80%.
tions. To evaluate this possibility, I followed Hudson Kam and Newport (2009)
and set a “consistency threshold” of 90%: each participant was coded as con-
sistent main or consistent none if they produced the main or no determiner,
respectively, on at least 90% of the valid trials. They were coded as consistent
noise if they produced one of the noise determiners consistently on at least 90%
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of the valid trials, and not consistent if they did not produce any determiner
type more than 90% of the time. As Figure 4(a) shows, few participants were
consistent in any way, and differences between conditions were not significant
(p = 0.796, Fisher’s exact test).
In order to ensure that this result was not a by-product of the exclusion cri-
teria, I ran the same analysis for all subjects, not just those that got 9 out of 20
correct, and included all trials in which the participant produced any response
at all. This result, shown in Figure 4(b), is qualitatively identical (p = 0.373,
Fisher’s exact test). I also repeated the two analyses with a consistency thresh-
olds of 80%; the results are shown in Figure 4(c) and 4(d). Although the anal-
ysis with exclusion criteria showed a significant difference between conditions
(p = 0.034, Fisher’s exact test), Figure 4(c) suggests that this is because par-
ticipants in some conditions were actually less consistent than in the no load
condition. The analysis without exclusion criteria did not show a significant
difference between conditions (p = 0.059, Fisher’s exact test).
2.2.3. Does working memory span have any effect on performance?
The results presented thus far suggest that people with less available work-
ing memory capacity (i.e., those in the load conditions) did not regularize more
than did those in the control condition. The experiment also provides another
way to evaluate how working memory capacity affects regularization: by ana-
lyzing whether individual differences in performance on the initial complex span
task predicts differential performance on the word-learning task. As one would
expect, performance on the complex span task is positively and significantly
correlated with accuracy for nouns (r = 0.2653, p = 0.005) and performance
on the load task (r = 0.225, p = 0.031) when considering only participants and
trials that fit the exclusion criteria. When evaluating the full dataset, the same
is true (complex span to noun accuracy: r = 0.343, p < 0.0001; complex span
to load task performance: r = 0.235, p = 0.004). Regardless of whether the ex-
clusion criteria are applied, participants with greater working memory capacity
learned more noun labels, and did better on the interference task.
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Did participants with lower working memory capacity regularize more? The
correlation between working memory capacity and the regularization index is
non-significant regardless of whether the exclusion criteria are applied (with ex-
clusion criteria: r = 0.024, p = 0.803; without exclusion criteria: r = −0.029, p =
0.706). This suggests that working memory capacity has no relationship to the
tendency to regularize in this experiment.
2.2.4. Conclusion
Overall, these results suggest that adult participants placed under cognitive
load during language learning do not tend to regularize inconsistent linguistic
input. First, the load tasks in this experiment did appear to tax the participants,
as evident in their performance on the load tasks as well as their decreased
ability to learn nouns when under load. Second, participants under load did not
regularize more, regardless of the exclusion criteria used. Finally, there was no
relationship between working memory and tendency to regularize in this task.
What is going on here? One possibility is that children simply have a prior
bias to favor regularization, whereas adults do not. This bias might be language-
specific (e.g., Bickerton, 1984) or more domain-general (which would be consis-
tent with observed age-related differences in probability matching); either way,
it would result from something other than age-related differences in memory.
It is also possible that memory limitations during learning (as opposed to re-
trieval, as suggested by Hudson Kam and Chang, 2009), should not result in
regularization.
I explore this possibility in the next section by using a computational model
to investigate the expected effects of both prior biases and memory limitations,
and how they trade off against each other. Because the Less is More hypothe-
sis does not specify under what precise assumptions about memory one would
expect limitations to result in regularization, the model is designed to evaluate
a variety of possible such assumptions, ranging from more to less realistic, and
aiming to qualitatively capture effects stemming from both working and long-
term memory. The model demonstrates that in the absence of any prior bias for
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regularization, memory limitations affecting encoding and/or storage should not
result in regularization unless they distort the data in a particular way. When
there is a prior bias for regularization, a memory-limited learner should show
regularization but a non-memory limited learner should not. When there is no
such bias, even a memory-limited learner will not regularize. This implies that
child-adult differences in regularization are probably not due to memory limi-
tations on encoding or storage, at least given the current well-accepted models
of memory considered here.
3. Computational analysis
Most tasks in which there is the potential for regularization can be described
abstractly as tasks in which there are k possible outcomes and the learner must
learn the distribution over those outcomes. In the experiment in this paper there
are six outcomes associated with each noun (five for each of the determiners,
and one for no determiner), while in a typical probability matching task, the
outcomes might be the frequency of different colors of flashing lights or cards in
a deck.
This situation is captured mathematically by the multinomial distribution,
where θi denotes the probability of outcome i, θ = (θ1, . . . θk) is a vector repre-
senting the probabilities associated with each outcome category, and
∑k
i=1 θi =
1. Since the experiment has multiple words, each of which could potentially be
associated with a different distribution over outcomes, it is necessary to capture
a separate θ(j) for each word j. For notational clarity, the (j) superscript is
suppressed throughout the rest of this paper. In a multinomial distribution, the
data for the observed outcomes y (where each yi is a count of the number of
times the ith category occurred) are generated from the underlying vector of








where N is the total number of observations. The task of the learner is to
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reason backward from the outcomes y to infer the nature of the underlying
“true” distribution θ. For instance, imagine observing three instances of one
determiner and two instances of another: we would write this as y = [3 2]. A
learner who probability matched would infer that θ = [0.6 0.4], whereas one
that regularized might infer that θ =[1.0 0.0].
Which distribution is learned will depend on two things: the nature of the
data y and any prior beliefs about what θ should look like. The importance of
the data is obvious, but the presence of a prior is also key. A complete absence
of prior belief would mean that θ should always match the observed distribution
y precisely; such a learner would never generalize beyond the input at all and
would always precisely probability match. It is possible to have very mild prior
beliefs – e.g., the weak expectation that any outcome is equally likely – which
would still enable some generalization.
3.0.5. Modeling prior biases
The most natural and widely used prior for multinomial data is the Dirichlet
distribution (Gelman et al., 2003). This model uses a symmetric Dirichlet dis-
tribution, which imposes no prior bias in favor of any one outcome more than
another across the whole dataset. Symmetric Dirichlet distributions have one
parameter, α, which captures the degree to which each item (each noun, in this
case) is expected to be associated with only one outcome (determiner); it gov-
erns the extent of the bias for regularization. If α is very small, the model will
assume that each noun is associated with only one determiner (although, be-
cause the prior is symmetric, it will have no prior bias about which determiner is
most likely); this constitutes a strong prior bias for regularization. When α = 1,
there is no bias for regularization; it is weakly assumed that each outcome will
occur with equal probability. I evaluate the role of the prior by considering four
values of α: 1 (no bias), 0.1 (weak bias), 0.01 (medium bias), and 0.001
(strong bias).
Can a prior ever be learned? In the present case, the prior is simply
higher-level knowledge about the expected distribution of determiners (out-
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comes) across nouns (items). It is indeed possible to learn this sort of informa-
tion; formally, this corresponds to learning about α rather than pre-specifying
it (Kemp et al., 2007; Perfors et al., 2010). Doing so would entail making
higher-level inferences not just about the nouns and determiners that have been
observed, but also about nouns and determiners in general. For instance, if in
case A one observed many nouns, each associated with only one determiner, one
might learn that α was closer to 0.01 or 0.001; conversely, in case B, observing
many nouns, all associated with many determiners, would imply that α is closer
to 1. This sort of “learning on multiple levels” can license more appropriate
inferences; it enables the learner to correctly respond to a new noun, rather
than being guided by a prior bias that might be inappropriate.
Because a prior is necessary, learning about α doesn’t mean removing any
bias entirely; it simply means setting the prior bias one level higher. Just as
α governs the behavior of θ, so too does a parameter at the higher level (call
it λ) govern α. Intuitively, λ places constraints on α in a similar way that α
places constraints on θ; an extreme value of λ would constrain which values of
α were probable. However, since λ is one level “removed” from the data, the
constraints it places on the range of probable values of θ are correspondingly
weaker. Put another way, a learner who could learn α would essentially have a
weaker prior about the nature of θ, and more flexibility to account for a range
of data – being able to respond sensibly to both cases A and B above. There is
some evidence that adults and children are capable of learning α in a linguistic
context (Perfors et al., 2010; Wonnacott, 2011).
Because of these considerations, in addition to systematically varying values
of α, I also model the situation in which α is learned. This model is a special
case of a model specified in detail elsewhere (Kemp et al., 2007; Perfors et al.,
2010). Formally, α is generated by an exponential distribution parameterized
by λ, which is set to 1; this reflects weak prior knowledge that α does not have
an extreme value.
Predictions about the expected distribution over outcomes given the data
and the priors are given by Bayes Rule, shown in Equation 2. (During the cases
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in which α is not learned, P (α|λ) is a constant). The integral is approximated by
using an MCMC algorithm to draw 10,000 samples of the posterior distribution
over θ. The results are calculated based on 100 independent runs for each
condition and level of memory limitation.
P (θ|y, α, λ) = P (y|θ)P (θ|α)P (α|λ)∫
θ′ P (y|θ′)P (θ′|α)P (α|λ)dθ′
(2)
3.0.6. Modeling memory limitations
In addition to varying the strength of the prior bias for regularization, it is
necessary to also model the effects of memory. The modelling approach in this
paper is focused on the computational level of analysis (Marr, 1982): the cen-
tral question is about how altering or deleting the data available to the learner
affects the inferences that can be made. I am not concerned with modelling
the time course and/or cause of forgetting (e.g., Anderson and Schooler, 1991;
Hitch et al., 1996; Brown et al., 2007; Lewandowsky et al., 2009) or capturing
how memory is integrated with other aspects of human cognition, like central
processing (e.g., Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Ober-
auer et al., 2003; Barrouillet et al., 2004; Unsworth et al., 2009). This vastly
simplifies the nature of the modelling choices that must be made: it is only
necessary to capture the ways that different hypotheses about the nature of
memory limitations predict changes in the pattern or quantity of data available
to the learner. I consider four different ways, inspired by different current the-
ories of memory, in which the pattern and/or quantity of the data might be
altered by memory limitations. Note that this framework does not assume that
limitations on memory encoding lead to forgetting per se; just that the effect of
both forgetting and failure to accurately encode is to distort or lessen the data
available to the learner.
Drop. One possibility is to assume, as a first approximation, that memory loss
means dropping data at random. Memory limitations can therefore be modeled
by changing the probability m that a given data point will be dropped (we vary
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m from 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 90%).14 Although extremely simplistic, this
approach is roughly consistent with theories of memory loss that suggest that it
primarily acts on individual tokens, and is a function of temporal processes or
interference (e.g., Murdoch, 1960; Brown et al., 2007) or cognitive factors like
processing or rehearsal (e.g., Carpenter et al., 1990; Salthouse, 1991; Fry and
Hale, 1996; Lewandowsky, 2011). This is because issues like the temporal nature
of forgetting or the effects of rehearsal do not impact the overall shape of what
data is ultimately remembered by the system, at least assuming all of the data
are presented randomly in the first place (as they are in all of the experiments
considered here).
Another possibility is to assume that memory limitations result in data being
forgotten and then reconstructed by the mind. The following two conditions
capture different ways of implementing this possibility.
Random. A trivial way to reconstruct forgotten data would be to randomly
reassign it to any of the possible outcomes with equal probability; this is the
random condition. Thus, an error rate of m% would mean that a forgot-
ten determiner is randomly reassigned to another determiner outcome with
m%probability. Although this condition is not very realistic, including it serves
as a baseline to compare others to.
Prior. Most of the research on memory-based reconstruction suggests that
forgotten data is not reconstructed randomly (e.g., Estes, 1997; Schacter et al.,
2011). Rather, remembering reactivates the brain regions associated with the
experience of the information (Wheeler et al., 2000). Memories appear to be
reconstructed to line up with the “gist” or associates of the items that are re-
membered (Roediger and McDermott, 1995; Brainerd and Reyna, 2005; Gallo,
14It is occasionally possible for high error rates that all data may be eliminated. Although it
would be possible to capture this simply by giving the model no data, it is not straightforward
to determine how that model would generate new data, since the model has effectively seen
no possible outcomes. We therefore capture the “zero data” case (in all conditions) by giving
the model one data point for “no determiner.” This is a bit ad hoc, but any choice made here
would be similarly ad hoc. Because it is rare for all data to be completely eliminated, this
case is does not drive the main findings here.
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2006) or to match the schemas we use to interpret the world (Bartlett, 1932;
Lichtenstein and Brewer, 1979; Loftus, 2005). It is possible to roughly capture
this basic idea within our framework by assuming that forgotten data is re-
constructed according to its prior probability. This can be modelled using the
Chinese Restaurant Process (CRP):
P (determiner i|previous data) = ni
N + α
P (new determiner|previous data) = α
N + α
where ni refers to the number of observations involving determiner i made so far,
N is the number of observations total, and α is the same parameter that captures
the prior bias. The Chinese Restaurant Process gives the same distribution that
draws from a Dirichlet process do, which is why the CRP is a natural way to
capture memory loss within this model. In this condition, an error rate of m%
would mean that a data point has m% chance of being “forgotten” and then
reconstructed according to the CRP. Note that when α is learned, it is not
straightforward to model this sort of reconstruction, since the inferred prior (α)
would be constantly changing; I therefore do not attempt to do so.
So far, these conditions have presumed that memory limitations involve dis-
tortions to the data on the token level; that is, individual tokens are forgotten
or reconstructed. However, some models of memory make a distinction between
types and tokens. The final condition attempts to capture the spirit of this
distinction.
Decay. More neurologically-inspired models of memory sometimes make an
important distinction between types and tokens (e.g., Kanwisher, 1987; Chun,
1997; Bowman and Wyble, 2007). For instance, Bowman and Wyble (2007)
propose that memory involves two stages. The first is devoted to processing,
which effectively establishes fragile type representations. For an item to be
represented more durably, it must make it through a second stage, which is
the entrance to working memory. It is in this second stage that the system
attempts to associate each type with a discrete episode, or token. Working
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memory encoding is thus the process of binding a token to a type. Items at the
first stage (types) are subject to rapid decay, but are reactivated by new tokens.
There are many complexities within the Bowman and Wyble (2007) model
that are not relevant to the grain at which memory is being modeled here.
However, the basic picture – of types that decay but can be reactivated by new
tokens – is something that can be captured within this framework. To do so, the
amount of decay d is modeled as 1−m, wherem is the error rate. This quantity is
multiplied by the distribution of data in the input. Fractional numbers of tokens
are converted to integers by rounding proportional to their distance from the
nearest integer. For instance, consider a determiner distribution for one noun
of [6 1 1 1 1 0], indicating that six tokens of one determiner, one token each of
the other five, and no tokens with no determiner have been observed. An error
rate of 20% would be modeled by multiplying that determiner distribution by
0.8, producing [4.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0]. Each resulting token would be rounded up
with 80% probability (because their fractional portion is 0.8); thus, a possible
version of this data with the memory limitation applied would be [5 1 1 0 1 0].
These four conditions are not intended to capture all of the details of current
theories of memory. Most of the details are largely relevant on the algorithmic
rather than the computational level, and contain many complexities that are
beyond the scope of this paper. The conditions are intended to capture the
range of ways that memory might affect the pattern and quantity of data that
is available to the learner, since the central question is how that changes the
nature of the inferences such a learner might make.
3.0.7. Results
Figure 5 shows expected performance by prior bias and memory. To make the
model results comparable to the experimental findings, consistency is calculated
the same way as in the experiment: e.g., consistent main means that on that
iteration the model predicted that 90% or more of the determiners should be
the main one, while consistent noise means that on that iteration the model
predicted that 90% or more of the determiners should be a particular noise one.
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Figure 5: Model performance varying the strength of the prior bias (columns) and the effect of
different kinds of memory limitation (rows). Each graph shows the proportion of consistent
classifications out of 100 iterations (on the y axis) as a function of the percentage of memory
affected (on the x axis): m% means that m% of the data are either dropped (Drop), flipped
randomly (Random), reconstructed based on the prior (Prior), or had a proportional affect
on the decay rate of types (Decay). Across all conditions, regularization only occurs when
memory is limited and there is a prior for regularization.
Each of the stacked bars reflects the proportion of runs (out of 100) in which
the model achieved any of each kind of consistency.
The first thing to notice about these results is that they are all quite similar:
with one exception, the qualitative pattern is the same regardless of how the
memory limitations are modeled. The one exception is the random condition,
which shows no regularization at all, ever. Of course, that condition was the least
grounded in the literature and was intended mainly as a comparison condition
for the more realistic possibilities. All of the other conditions demonstrate two
basic effects.
First, simply having a prior bias for regularization is insufficient to cause
regularization. In all memory conditions, even when the prior bias is strong,
there is no regularization when the error rate is small (i.e., there are few memory
limitations during encoding). The reason for this is clear: a prior for regulariza-
tion only has a noticeable effect when there is a tiny amount of data. Memory
limitations have the effect of limiting the quantity of (accurate) data, but other
data-limiting factors might also include bottlenecks in the input or attentional
31
restrictions.15 The reason that a prior bias alone is insufficient is because a
sufficient quantity of data will always overcome any prior; a rational learner
should think it much more likely that a given determiner actually occurs 60%
of the time if it is observed in 600 out of 1000 observations rather than 3 out of
5. Because quantity of the data matters, a prior bias only has an effect when
there is little veridical data available. The exact amount of data that counts as
“little” will depend a great deal on other characteristics of the learner, but this
qualitative pattern – of any effect of the prior being swamped by enough data
– is a general hallmark of rational reasoning.
The second implication of these results is that memory limitations alone do
not result in regularization either. No models showed any hint of regularization
in the no bias or learned alpha conditions, and only the prior-based recon-
struction model (prior) regularized in the weak bias condition. The reason
a prior bias is necessary is because without it, none of the memory limitations
change the overall pattern of data towards an regularized one. To illustrate this,
consider one noun whose determiners followed the distribution in the data. If
the learner randomly forgot 60% of those datapoints (as in the drop condition),
it is unlikely that they would forget all of the noise determiners; it is much more
likely that they would forget some of the noise ones and some of the main ones.
Reconstructing forgotten data according to the prior partially counterbalances
this effect, thus amplifying a weak bias, but if the prior is not biased at all
then reconstructing according to it does not impose a bias. Reconstructing
data randomly (as in the random condition) makes the “remembered” data
more uniform, thus destroying any tendency for regularization, regardless of the
nature of the prior. And finally, modeling forgetting as gradual decay (as in the
decay condition) does not change the pattern of data at all.
What about situations with very high memory loss, like 80% or 90%? It is
15Another factor might be that there simply isn’t much data to begin with. However,
although children’s linguistic input is impoverished in many ways, this alone cannot drive the
observed experimental differences between adults and children, since both are generally given
the same amount of input (e.g., Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005); nor does it apply to the
present experiment.
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true that in those situations, so much is forgotten or distorted that the pattern
has been somewhat altered. For instance, in most of the memory conditions,
at 90% memory loss it is more likely for the main determiners to be remem-
bered than any of the noise determiners, simply because there are more main
determiners in the first place. However, when memory loss is that high, there
are very few data points remembered at all. When there is little data available,
it is outweighed by the prior; and if the prior does not favor regularization, the
learner will assume that any outcome is possible. Thus, there is a bit of a catch-
22 inherently built in. When memory loss is low, it isn’t sufficient to change
the pattern of the data; when it is high, the pattern is changed, but there is
so little data that the prior plays the main role in guiding generalization. In
either case, memory limitations shouldn’t lead to regularization unless there is
already a prior bias favoring it.
Of course, the preceding analysis depends critically on the premise that a
high memory loss leaves so little data that the prior plays the main role in
guiding generalization. But suppose there were more data to learn from in
the first place? In that case, might high memory loss significantly distort the
pattern while still retaining enough data to not be outweighed by the prior? To
test this, I reran all of the analyses in Figure 5 with 100 times as much data.
The results still show no regularization in the absence of a prior bias. There is
less regularization overall – not a surprise, since there is so much data and any
prior biases are outweighed by sufficient data. But the same catch-22 applies:
if there is enough memory limitation to change the pattern, the amount of data
is so low that the prior plays the main role in guiding generalization.
This analysis suggests that the only model of forgetting that would change
the underlying pattern would be one in which all of the less-frequent outcomes
(like the noise determiners) are preferentially forgotten – that is, forgotten more
than would be predicted by any of the memory models considered here. In other
words, memory itself would have to distort the data towards regularization.
This is what happened in the prior condition, which is why we observe more
regularization in that condition than in any other. But even this only occurs
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when there is at least a weak bias for regularization: are there models of memory
that predict this sort of distortion regardless of the nature of the prior bias?
One model that might have this effect could be a threshold model, in which
types are remembered only if a threshold number of tokens have been seen. If
that threshold is higher than the number of noise determiners but lower than
the number of main determiners, such a model could effectively distort the
data so that the only input that makes it past the memory filter are main
determiners.
Such a model, however, does not appear to be very realistic, at least not
for explaining this situation. First, the pattern of data it would produce is
somewhat odd. It suggests an all-or-nothing type of response in which the
main determiner is always regularized if the data falls into the “sweet spot”
where the threshold is higher than the noise determiners but lower than the
main determiners, but is never regularized otherwise. In particular, any kind
of threshold or all-or-none-type model predicts a sudden and large qualitative
shift as the amount of data falls below threshold – from always remembering
and using a given type, to never doing so. This appears to contradict decades’
worth of experiments showing that memory degradation is gradual. Although
it might be possible to address this objection by allowing the threshold to be
noisy, there is a more severe problem: any such model would only predict reg-
ularization while the quantity of data falls below the threshold. As soon there
is enough data to cross the threshold, regularization should cease. Yet creole
speakers do not eventually abandon creole and come to resemble pidgin speak-
ers despite spending their entire lives exposed to pidgin, the deaf child Simon
did not gradually become more inconsistent with age, and adult learners in our
experiment do not show an initial stage of regularization before their data su-
passed their threshold. In fact, memory limitations cannot be an explanation for
differences between adult learners and native speakers (who acquired the lan-
guage during childhood) unless the effects should remain even as the quantity
of data increases; this is not the case for a threshold-type model.
Second, there are no models of memory encoding that I am aware of that
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qualitatively correspond to this kind of model. The threshold models of memory
that do exist are dual-process models of the conscious recognition of whether a
particular item has been seen before (e.g., Swets, 1986; Batchelder and Riefer,
1990; Yonelinas et al., 1996); they are not models of the sort of memory relevant
to this kind of task, which is generation based and requires a recall model.
Moreover, these threshold models presume that the underlying memory trace is
continuous and that the threshold governs conscious recognition of the episodic
memory event only. Even these models have been criticised (e.g., Dunn, 2008),
and continuous analogues have been proposed in an effort to better fit the
empirical data (e.g., Wixted and Mickes, 2010).
What if memory operated in such a way that a separate forgetting process
applied to types and tokens? Although this possibility is not consistent with
any memory models I am aware of, it may fit within the learning framework of
Goldwater et al. (2011). This approach is a model of inference that envisions
language as generated by a two-stage model. The first stage is responsible
for generating the allowable word types, while the second generates different
numbers of tokens of each type, thus transforming the word frequencies of the
first stage so that they more closely match natural language. Although the
framework is a model of word generation rather than forgetting, if we make the
additional assumptions that types and tokens are also forgotten separately, it
can be captured within the modelling framework here. Doing so requires setting
an error level for types and a separate error level for tokens. I performed a this
analysis and found that for a wide range of error levels, particularly those most
consistent with the best performance of the model16 in Goldwater et al. (2011),
regularization again does not occur without a prior bias.
A final type of memory process that is worth thinking about is one that is
more neurologically based and therefore difficult to incorporate into the mod-
elling framework here. For instance, memory has been argued to be captured
16These are errors in which the probability of forgetting types and the probability of for-
getting tokens are not widely divergent from each other.
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by a network where multiple constraints support gradual learning of repeated,
interleaved items (as in, e.g., McClelland et al., 1995). This model hypothesizes
two complementary learning systems. One, centered in the hippocampus, is de-
signed for rapidly learning specific events, and assigns distinct representations
to individual stimuli. The other, in the neocortex, slowly learns statistical reg-
ularities, and thus forms an abstraction based on the shared structure amongst
the individual tokens. The closest thing this maps (very roughly) onto in the
modeling framework in this paper are for the vector of observed counts y to
be represented in the hippocampus and the inferred distribution θ to be rep-
resented in the neocortex. Notably, these network-type models assume that
learning and forgetting in both cases is gradual – which would be most closely
captured within this framework in a way analogous to the DROP condition.
These network-type models would only distort the data in the peculiar way nec-
essary to cause regularization if, somehow, in the transfer from the hippocampus
to the neocortex (i.e., the process of abstracting from y to θ) the less frequent
outcomes were to be forgotten more than their frequency would predict. This
does not seem to follow from the structure of the model (McClelland et al.,
1995), although we should always be cautious about trying to map such dif-
ferent frameworks onto each other. I return to the larger issue of investigating
memory limitations on a more process or neurological level in the discussion.
It is of course always possible that I have missed a model, or that one can
be created that distorts data in the pattern necessary to cause regularization.
To explain how memory limitations alone lead to regularization it would have
to be independently motivated by other memory phenomena, as well as address
the difficulties raised earlier.
3.0.8. Conclusion
These modeling results suggest that under a wide variety of assumptions
about the nature of memory, memory limitations during encoding and storage
alone do not lead to regularization: a prior bias to favor regularization is also
necessary. This is because in the absence of such a prior bias, such memory
36
limitations do not change the underlying pattern of data. Memory limitations
would lead to regularization only if human memory distorted the pattern data in
a particular way – remembering frequent items more than their frequency would
warrant and less frequent items less than their frequency would warrant. The
next section discusses the implications and limitations of these results, along
with the experimental findings.
4. Discussion
The central question addressed in this paper concerned the relationship be-
tween memory limitations and regularization. What assumptions about memory
are necessary for memory limitations to lead to regularization, and why? Previ-
ous work suggests that facilitating memory retrieval can increase the tendency to
probability match (Hudson Kam and Chang, 2009), but it was unclear whether
limitations in encoding or storage should affect regularization, or why. This
study was designed to explore the effect of this kind of memory limitation using
both experimental and computational methods. The experimental results indi-
cate that adults who are placed under memory load while learning an artificial
language do not regularize more than adults who are not. The computational
results offer one explanation for these findings, suggesting that under realistic
models of memory encoding and storage, regularization should only occur in the
presence of both memory limitations and a prior bias for regularization.
In the next pages I critically discuss these results. I first concentrate on the
experiment, followed by the model, and finally conclude by exploring what these
findings mean about the role of memory in regularization and the implications
for language learning more broadly.
4.1. Experiment
Participants were placed under memory load while simultaneously learning
a simple artificial “language” composed of nouns paired inconsistently with de-
terminers. In order to explore the effects of different kinds of load – and to
ensure that the load tasks actually taxed working memory – there were six
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different conditions, which differed according to the type of load. Although
all of the load conditions were difficult enough to significantly impair overall
learning, participants did not regularize more than participants in a control
(non-load) condition. Moreover, complex memory span did not predict regular-
ization. These results suggest that memory limitations during the encoding and
storage stage do not lead to regularization.
Although it is in theory possible that the load tasks did not sufficiently chal-
lenge our participants, this is unlikely. Divided attention during encoding is
known to cause deficits in memory performance (e.g., Craik et al., 1996). More-
over, it is clear that participants took the load tasks seriously, performing far
above chance in them. In addition, people who did well on the load tasks did
better, rather than worse, at the language learning task, suggesting that partic-
ipants were not disregarding the load task in order to focus on word learning.
This result also implies that participants did not disregard the word learning
task in order to focus on the load task; in fact, they appeared highly motivated
to do well on the word learning task, since they had to label answers in front
of the experimenter and could not hide behind the safe anonymity of a com-
puter screen. Anecdotally, the participants found the task extremely challenging
(several complained afterword that it was the hardest experiment they had ever
done), and indeed the presence of load had a large and significant effect on noun
learning.
What about the converse possibility? Perhaps the task was so difficult that
with more training, regularization might emerge. This is also unlikely, since
there was no tendency toward increased regularization over the course of the
experiment. It is also worth noting that this number trials was sufficient to
observe regularization in much of the probability matching literature (Weir,
1964; Derks and Paclisanu, 1967; Pecan and Schvaneveldt, 1970) and that this
experiment had a similar number of observations per noun as in Hudson Kam
and Newport (2005) and Hudson Kam and Newport (2009), where children
did regularize. More generally, if difficulty of the load tasks is an issue in either
direction, it implies that the dependence of regularization on memory limitations
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must be extremely precisely calibrated: memory limitations cannot be so high
as to render learning impossible, nor so low as to not lead to regularization.
This is a balancing act that, if nothing else, seems unlikely to precisely describe
the state of most child language learners.
Another concern lies in the applicability of this experiment to the previous
studies, and to child language acquisition in general. There are a number of
differences between the experiments in this paper and the Hudson Kam exper-
iments, and even more differences between our experiments and the process of
language learning over developmental time. The Hudson Kam and Newport
(2005) studies involved learning and producing noun-determiner pairs in the
context of a limited grammar over multiple days rather than one session, and
the same is true a thousandfold in the case of child language acquisition in the
real world. How can we be certain that the lack of regularization under load
that was observed in our studies would occur if the language were richer or the
learning process more prolonged?
The answer is that we cannot be certain of this, and this is an area where
further work would be very useful. However, there are several reasons this
concern does not invalidate the present work. For instance, consider the issue
that the language learning task in this experiment was far simpler than learning
a real language. Might this cause the participants to therefore treat it more like
paired-associate learning rather than like learning a language with rich internal
structure? It is hard to say, but even if they did, according to Less is More this
shouldn’t affect their tendency to regularize: there is nothing in the hypothesis
that predicts that people should only regularize in linguistic contexts. Indeed,
part of the empirical support for the hypothesis comes from the fact that children
but not adults regularize in non-linguistic contexts like prediction tasks (Weir,
1964; Derks and Paclisanu, 1967; Myers, 1976).
It is also worth asking why we should expect the complexity of the system
in which the nouns and determiners are embedded to matter. One possibility
might be that if learning is embedded in a complex linguistic system, the learner
might have fewer resources to apply to learning the pairing. In other words, the
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complexity of the system might play the exact same role that the load tasks
do. Yet here there was no additional regularization with load, and the more
difficult load tasks (as measured by impact on noun learning) did not have
more regularization than the simpler ones. Another possibility might be that
people bring different prior assumptions to word learning tasks than grammar
learning tasks. Yet even though the Hudson Kam tasks were embedded within
a grammar learning framework, they still consisted of the fundamentally same
task: mapping noun-determiner pairs onto referents. Why would people treat
one as word learning and one as grammar learning? Plus, even if they did, there
is no reason to think that this would make them less likely to regularize in the
word-learning case. If anything, biases like mutual exclusivity would imply that
regularization was more likely in a word learning context; even if such biases did
not apply, there is evidence that statistical learning in the presence of variable
input looks similar in both situations (e.g., Vouloumanos, 2007).
Another potential factor is that these experiments took place in one session
rather than spread over multiple days (as in the case of the previous Hudson
Kam work) or multiple years (as with child language acquisition). Is it possible
that regularization requires a more extended learning phase, or consolidation
due to intervening sleep? There is indeed research suggesting that sleep may be
useful for both consolidating specific episodic memories (Gais and Born, 2004)
and generalizing to new stimuli (Fenn et al., 2003; Gomez et al., 2006). Thus,
the hypothesis that sleep might be critical for regularization, perhaps because
of how it interacts with memory formation, is an intriguing one that cannot
be ruled out. If it were correct, it would suggest that whatever is happening
during sleep has the effect of distorting the data available to the learner in the
way predicted by the modelling results here; left unexplained, however, is why
that type of distortion should occur given what we currently know about sleep
and the brain (e.g., McClelland et al., 1995; Walker, 2009).
A final question is what the load tasks actually disrupted. In general, they
were designed to disrupt many aspects of cognition, all of which can affect
what is processed, encoded, and stored. The tasks require people to retrieve
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information (word meanings in the verbal load condition, number and sym-
bol meanings in the operational and concurrent operational conditions,
memorized letters and nonsense words in the other conditions), to store informa-
tion in short-term memory (the numbers in the equation conditions, the words
and letters in the others), to manipulate representations (to determine the cor-
rect answer to the load questions), and to regulate attention between the load
task and the word learning task. These considerations make it quite likely that
the load tasks disrupted the process of word learning – in particular, the pro-
cess of attending, encoding, and storing the information about noun-determiner
pairings. One thing that they did not directly disrupt was retrieval, precisely
because the intent of this work was to explore whether and to what extent lim-
itations on non-retrieval aspects of memory lead to regularization. (Retrieval
was still an element of the task, but it did not differ between conditions.) In-
deed, the retrieval aspect of this task – the production test – was very similar to
that of the studies by Hudson Kam and colleagues. Although their participants
learned verbs as well as nouns and determiners, during the production task they
were given the verb, and thus only had to produce the noun-determiner pairs, as
in the present study (although some of the time they had to produce transitive
sentences with two noun-determiner pairs in a row).
Why would limitations during learning, rather than retrieval, not affect reg-
ularization? To explore that, we turn to the computational results.
4.2. Computational
The computational model systematically explored how different degrees and
types of realistic memory limitation affect the pattern of data available to the
learner, and how memory limitations interact with prior biases for or against
regularization. The model was deliberately designed to be extremely simple in
order to minimize the extent to which these results depend on arbitrary mod-
eling choices. The only free parameter in the model, α, governed the extent of
the prior bias for regularization and was systematically varied. The underlying
distribution being learned, the multinomial, is the most obvious and statisti-
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cally widely-used way of capturing distributional data when many outcomes
are likely, and the Dirichlet distribution is likewise the most widely-used and
mathematically elegant prior for multinomial data.
Memory limitations were modeled on Marr’s computational level, since the
central question was about how a learner’s generalizations are affected by the
input available to the cognitive system. The underlying premise was that mem-
ory limitations have the net effect of distorting the input available to the learner
in different ways. Modeling different distortions of that input – mostly differ-
ent patterns of deletion and alteration – allows us to explore the effect of these
distortions on the nature of generalizations made by the learner. We consid-
ered several different ways of distorting the input, inspired by leading models of
memory. These ranged from simply dropping data at random, to reconstructing
it based on one’s prior assumptions, to dropping types according to a decay pro-
cess. Under all of these assumptions about memory, regularization only occurs
when both memory limitations and a prior bias for regularization are present. In
general, regularization can only occur without a prior bias if the memory pro-
cess itself distorts the pattern of data available to the learner so as to remember
the most frequent items more than their frequency would warrant and the less
frequent items less. However, this type of distortion does not appear to emerge
naturally from any of the theories of memory captured here.
One assumption inherent in the model is that it is Bayesian, meaning that
it predicts the behavior of a rational learner. This means that the importance
of previous biases (the prior) and fitting the data (likelihood) are balanced
in a particular way (according to Bayes’ Rule). However, every model needs to
perform some tradeoff between these factors. Because of this, models that weigh
these tradeoffs differently might vary quantitatively, but all models except for
the most pathological17 should show that regularization is more likely when the
input is limited and the prior bias for it is strong.
17“Pathological models” include those that don’t learn at all from data or never generalize
at all beyond the data. Humans, of course, do neither of these things.
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It is also worth noting that, although the model is Bayesian, this is not a
typical ideal learning analysis; because the model incorporates different kinds
of memory limitations, it should be more properly understood as a “capacity
limited” rational model. It thus allows us to investigate what a rational learner
with certain capacity constraints might be expected to do. In particular, it pro-
vides a means to systematically evaluate the effect of different kinds of capacity
constraints, as I have done here. This sort of approach is an important step
toward bridging computational-level and process-level accounts of cognition.
Relatedly, because this is a computational-level model, there are many as-
pects of memory that I have not attempted to capture here. The model does not
include many of the issues that memory researchers most care about, from the
time course of memory and forgetting, to the low-level details of how memory
is implemented in the human brain, to the step-by-step integration of memory
and other aspects of cognition. The goal here is to abstract away from these
issues and to explore how different patterns of data distortion during learning
affect the types of inferences a rational learner makes. These findings can thus
inform future work investigating the effects of memory on a more process level.
What do our results suggest about memory? In one way, the findings are
more general than may first appear, since they apply to more cognitive capac-
ities than memory; in another, they are more limited, since they do not apply
to all kinds of memory. On the first point, these results are about how input
is distorted during learning; thus, any cognitive capacity that might distort
the input during learning is theoretically relevant. The main finding of this
research is that the only pattern of data distortion that leads to regulariza-
tion in the absence of a prior bias is one that retains high-frequency items and
drops or alters low-frequency items beyond what their frequency would warrant.
Because the particular distortions considered in this paper were motivated by
the memory literature, I am hesitant to conclude that attentional or execu-
tive processes do not have qualitative effects that distort the data in this way
(although they might). In terms of memory, none of the theories of memory
captured by my model resulted in that pattern of distortion. Threshold or “all
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or none” models of memory are one type of model that would be able to cap-
ture it, although such models have other problems. They do not correspond to
any current independently-motivated memory models that I am aware of, and
since they predict that regularization should eventually cease, they cannot ex-
plain the difference between native speakers and second-language learners (since
native speakers eventually have more data than second-language learners, and
thus should eventually regularize less rather than more). This is not meant as
a conclusive argument that no realistic memory model could distort data in the
precise way that would lead to regularization; however, it does seem unlikely at
this point.
It is important to note that the model presented here is a model of distortions
of the input that occurred before generalization. In other words, it is a model of
how cognitive or memory limitations affect what is learned – not a model of how
such limitations affect what is produced. It is therefore more about processing,
encoding, and storage rather than retrieval. This was deliberate, because the
main intent of this paper was to explore whether and to what extent non-
retrieval memory limitations affect the inferences and generalizations a learner
should make.
An additional important consideration is that the models captured here
mainly focus on memory in general rather than memory development in par-
ticular. This is mainly because it was unclear how to map what we know about
developmental changes in memory onto differences that would make a differ-
ence at the level of the model. For one thing, aside from children having smaller
working memory spans for the most part, there appear to be few behaviorally
observed differences between children and adults on simple working memory
tasks (e.g., Gathercole, 1999; Davidson et al., 2006). The differences that have
been observed or postulated are at the neurological level: the pre-frontal cortex
of children is more immature, and children recruit more of their hippocampus
during working memory tasks than do older adolescents and adults (Finn et al.,
2010). This is intriguing research, but at this stage it doesn’t make clear predic-
tions about what particular patterns or distortions, if any, should be imposed
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on the data available to the learner as a result of differential hippocampal in-
volvement and/or PFC immaturity. In fact, there is reason to believe any of
the possible alternatives: that they should cause children to regularize more,
or regularize less, or have no effect. On one hand, as discussed later, an im-
mature PFC is consistent with the suggestion that adults should probability
match more (Thompson-Schill et al., 2009), although this would affect cognitive
control more than memory. On the other hand, hippocampal involvement is
consistent with the stimuli being more novel or complex for children, in which
case one would expect more binding of individual patterns and therefore less
abstract learning and generalization on their part.
Conversely, if the relative novelty of the stimuli leads to differences in the
actual phonological representation, then this is not a difference which would
show up in this modelling framework (in which the word representations are
discrete). To the extent that the lack of a detailed phonological representation
has an effect on the nature or pattern of forgetting – if it does – this might mat-
ter. If words are encoded according to their phonological features in some way,
being presented with multiple different novel words could cause interference ef-
fects on the level of the phonological encoding, such that none are remembered
well. This is probably not what is going on in the experiments in this paper –
or if it is, it is not leading to regularization – since if it were, one might expect
the concurrent verbal condition to show interference effects and thus regu-
larization. But effects due to distributed representations more generally cannot
at this point be ruled out, and indeed may be occurring in other experiments,
such as Hudson Kam and Newport (2009). Further research investigating the
effects of memory limitation using distributed representations is necessary.
4.3. Bringing it all together
How do these results compare to previous studies? In Hudson Kam and
Newport (2009), adults were found to regularize when presented with extremely
small probabilities (for instance, 16 determiners each occurring 2.5% of the
time, rather than four determiners each occurring 10% of the time, as in our
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experiment). It is tempting to conclude that perhaps a threshold model of
memory is appropriate in this case, and 2.5% of the time is “below threshold”
whereas 10% was not. This is probably unlikely, not just because a simplistic
threshold model of memory does not appear to otherwise have independent
support, but because it would predict that adults in our experiment should
have regularized at the beginning of the experiment (while the data were still
below threshold). However, there were no differences in regularization over the
course of the experiment. Although I can only speculate, it is probably more
likely that other cognitive factors, like attention or metacognitive reasoning,
explain the Hudson Kam and Newport (2009) results. Perhaps once there are
enough alternatives, or each occurs rarely enough, the alternatives are simply
disregarded. One possible reason for this might be that adults recognize that
real language contains errors; perhaps determiners that occur rarely enough
are ignored because they are thought to be errors (Perfors, 2012). It is also
possible that such determiners could not be encoded in enough phonological
detail (either because of their low frequency or due to interference with the many
other determiners) for them to be generated, as hypothesized above. Future
work is necessary to explore these possibilities.
In Hudson Kam and Chang (2009), adults were made to probability match
more by being given assistance with retrieval: instead of being expected to
generate words on their own, they were presented with a list of all possible words
and simply asked to pick which words from the list they would say. This converts
the task to more of a recognition than a pure production task. In this situation,
people probability matched more precisely, producing main determiners around
60% of the time rather than around 70% of the time, as they do without help
during retrieval. What explains these results?
The most likely explanation is that Hudson Kam and Chang (2009) found the
pattern they did because they were manipulating memory retrieval rather than
encoding or storage. The present modeling results aren’t relevant to retrieval
– indeed, one can imagine several different retrieval processes that might make
a learner regularize in production but still have an underlying representation
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that more closely matches the probabilities in the input. However, it is also
worth noting that Hudson Kam and Chang (2009) aimed to make adults less
like children by making the cognitive load easier, rather than to make adults act
more like children by making it harder. There may be an inherent asymmetry to
adults’ performance: perhaps it is relatively easy to make adults regularize less,
but making them regularize more is difficult. This is the case in the decision-
making literature, in which great efforts have been made to stop adults from
probability matching, often to no avail.
That said, if retrieval entirely drives regularization, it raises some prob-
lematic questions. It is unclear how retrieval effects – or, indeed, any sort of
performance-driven effect – can constitute the full explanation for children’s ten-
dency to learn languages that are more consistent than their input, as in the case
of deaf children like Simon (Singleton and Newport, 2004) or creolization (e.g.,
Mu¨hlha¨usler, 1986). If the underlying inconsistency is reproduced in the repre-
sentation (as the judgment task in Hudson Kam and Newport (2009) might sug-
gest), one would expect that once children’s retrieval difficulties lessen – whether
due to age or additional practice – then regularization would cease. Although
this happens with some regularization (e.g., verbs like “goed” or “maked”),
probably because the variation is not truly inconsistent, creole speakers do not
turn into pidgin speakers as they get older, and Simon did not gradually be-
come more inconsistent with age. The fact that these learners do not revert
to a more inconsistent language as their retrieval limitations decrease implies
that retrieval is not the only constraint, and that their actual representations
were regularized versions of the input. The analysis in this paper suggests that
most known models of memory limitations do not change one’s representations
in the way necessary for regularization; taken together, this suggests that some-
thing else – perhaps a prior bias for regularization – is necessary to explain the
difference between children and adults.
But what is meant by “a prior bias for regularization”? The model does not
make any claims or statements about where one might originate. As such, there
are many possibilities, most of which have yet to be explored. One possibility
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is that, consistent with a different version of Less is More; such a bias might
reflect other cognitive differences between children and adults. For instance, in
addition to memory and processing speed, children and adults differ in their
levels of cognitive control, which has been identified as a potentially important
factor during language acquisition (Thompson-Schill et al., 2009). If children
struggle to engage in top-down processes to figure out general rules, they may
instead rely more strongly on more bottom-up or data-driven thinking. This
has been argued to cause them to take up the most frequent and reliable pat-
terns, whereas adults are capable of using their cognitive control to override this
tendency (Ramscar and Yarlett, 2007; Thompson-Schill et al., 2009). The effect
of limitations on cognitive control is not tested directly in the current paper,
although the interference-based load tasks may have taxed cognitive control to
at least some extent.
Executive control is related to other cognitive differences between children
and adults, such as the ability to use metacognitive strategies (e.g., Flavell et al.,
1995). It may be that adults’ ability to introspect and reason about their own
cognition makes them more likely to rely on explicit rather than implicit learn-
ing (Ullman, 2004) – a difference that has been hypothesized to be the root
of child-adult differences in language acquisition. Such metacognitive ability
might also make adults more likely to try to capture patterns in the input that
do not exist; this tendency has been suggested as an explanation for why adults
probability match in non-language tasks (Estes, 1976). It might result from
a generalized preference for simplicity or tendency to ignore exceptions on the
part of children. Might such attentional or strategic differences be themselves
related to memory? That is an open question, although at least in the catego-
rization literature, individual differences in working memory appear unrelated
to differences in strategy use (Craig and Lewandowsky, in press) or attention
(Sewell and Lewandowsky, in press). Another possibility is that children’s lim-
ited capacity means they are not capable of rapidly learning a prior bias, while
adults can; since regularization does not occur in the learned bias condition,
this might explain the difference between adult and child performance. These
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options are all speculative; much more work in this area needs to be done.
Overall, this paper does not argue against the Less is More hypothesis in
general. These results are irrelevant to the version of the hypothesis that is not
focused on regularization; in fact, there is a great deal of converging evidence
supporting the idea that “starting small” can help a learner to isolate and
analyze the separate components of a linguistic stimulus. The results also do
not argue against the idea that memory limitations in the form of retrieval affect
regularization. What this work does suggest, based on converging evidence from
computational modeling and seven experiments, is that cognitive limitations
during learning do not result in regularization in the absence of a prior bias
unless they distort the input in a particular way. Although much work remains
to be done, these findings place key empirical and theoretical constraints on how
and why cognitive limitations are predicted to affect regularization, and thus
have important implications for understanding the difference between child and
adult language acquisition.
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